Assessing the Effectiveness of Performance-Based Acquisition in Federal Agencies

Abstract

ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PERFORMANCE-BASED ACQUISITIONS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES Abstract: Performance-based systems are designed to foster high quality outcomes (Cohen & Eimecke, 2008; Heinrich, 2007; Kelman, 2002). From the construction of global industrial assets to securing the homeland (Bakshi and Gans 2010; Bubshait 2003), performance incentives are shown to have varying degrees of success in achieving desired outcomes. This study examines one performance tool – performance-based acquisitions (PBAs) – to test theories of contract design, forge new ground in contract implementation, and contribute to the body of knowledge relevant to the research and practice of procurement. Two primary research questions motivate the study: (1) Are PBAs linked to stronger performance on cost, schedule, quality, or technical requirements? (2) What factors contribute to (or detract from) effective implementation of PBAs? Determining whether performance-based contracts perform as anticipated is an important step in understanding how to improve contract performance and enhance public value. In order to answer these questions, a survey of federal acquisitions professionals will be conducted. The sample will be created by randomly selecting a subset of federal contracts from FY2014 from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG). Pre-survey interviews with federal contracting officials and contractors inform the development of the survey instrument. The survey will ask questions related to performance and contract management, to include: assessment of timeliness, quality, customer satisfaction, cost, ease of administration, etc. Gathering perceptual contract performance data will provide more detailed measures of performance not captured in FPDS-NG. Follow up interviews with contracting officials and contractors will also be conducted to glean additional insights and explore any anomalous results. The results of the proposed study have direct implications for government purchasers across federal agencies as well as relevance to their counterparts in state and local governments. Contract accountability – and ultimately public value – is compromised when contracts fail to perform; understanding the conditions under which performance-based contracts are used and succeed (or fail) will serve to increase efficient and effective use of public resources. Author: Amanda M. Girth is Assistant Professor at the John Glenn College of Public Affairs at The Ohio State University. Her research focuses on government contracting with a specific interest in performance and accountability, which has been published in the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Administration Review, and other outlets. Previously, Professor Girth was a manager for a global consulting firm where she supported information technology initiatives at the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. She also served in Michigan state government. References: Bakshi, N., & Gans, N. 2010. Securing the containerized supply chain: analysis of government incentives for private investment. Management Science 56(2): 219-233. Bubshait, A. A. 2003. Incentive/disincentive contracts and its effects on industrial projects. International Journal of Project Management 21: 63-70. Cohen, S. & W. Eimicke. 2008. The responsible contract manager: Protecting the public interest in an outsourced world. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Heinrich, C. J. (2007). False or fitting recognition? The use of high performance bonuses in motivating organizational achievements. Journal of policy analysis and management, 26(2), 281-304. Kelman, S. 2002. Contracting. In L. A. Salamon, (Ed.), The tools of government: A guide to the new governance. New York: Oxford University Press.

Document Details

Document Type
DoD Grant Award
Publication Date
Mar 11, 2016
Source ID
N002441510014

Entities

People

  • Amanda Girth

Organizations

  • Ohio State University
  • United States Navy

Tags

Readers

  • Economics
  • Government Contracting/Procurement.
  • Organizational Psychology.