Optimal Selection of Organizational Structuring for Complex System Development and Acquisitions
Abstract
The proposed research will create and evaluate a quantitative approach that reduces inefficiencies in the development and acquisition of complex systems by addressing the interplay between organizational incentives and product modularization. The development and acquisitions of a complex system (or multiple collaborating systems, e.g., system of systems) is strongly affected by communication mechanisms, resource channels, and the underlying incentives among constituent groups within an organization. Inefficient setups in this context often result in poor requirements being set, poor understanding of interfaces between elements of the complex systems and potential failure to achieve the desired return on investment. Prior research has already demonstrated that the complexity of a product reflects the complexity of the producing organization’s structure - however, there is little quantitative support to assist decision-makers in forming organizational structures that best fits the desired complex systems development and vice versa. We seek to leverage innovations from areas of operations research, game theory and psychological sciences to postulate a framework to reduce some of these inefficiencies by improving alignment between organizational performance measures and incentives to accurately reflect the modularization architecture of the system to be acquired.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Aug 08, 2016
- Source ID
- N002441610005
Entities
People
- Daniel Delaurentis
Organizations
- United States Navy
- University of Virginia