Evaluating WMD Proliferation Risks at the Nexus of Manufacturing Tools and Methods Used in DIY Communities
Abstract
U.S. nonproliferation policy has principally relied on the notion that the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be contained by limiting access to nuclear technology and nuclear materials through export controls. However, recently, additive and subtractive computer-aided manufacturing tools have become more widely accessible to Do-it-Yourself (DIY) communities of entrepreneurs and hobbyists – a development that could increase the number of companies and individuals capable of fabricating goods export-controlled due to WMD proliferation concerns. We intend to investigate how access to these tools by DIY communities decreases barriers for producing items on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)’s lists of goods and technologies controlled for export. Researchers will select a sub-set of these items, assess specific challenges in fabricating them, and determine if new manufacturing tools embraced by DIY communities may surmount those challenges and thereby cause new nonproliferation risks. Findings will be summarized in a Final Report that will inform strategies for outreach to DIY communities, raise awareness of potential proliferation risks, and recommend countermeasures such as new export control strategies. The intended audience of the Final Report will include NGOs, international organizations such as the United Nations and its Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee, multilateral export control regimes such as the NSG, and national governments – all of which seek to educate the private sector, academic institutions, and civil society overall on export controls as an important component of nonproliferation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Jul 07, 2016
- Source ID
- N002441610033
Entities
People
- Ferenc Dalnoki-veress
Organizations
- Middlebury College
- United States Department of Defense