Game-Theoretic Reasoning and Synthesis of Defense with Strategic Deception and Counter-Deception
Abstract
Military decision-making such as contested search and rescue, security patrol, etc., often operates against adversaries with asymmetric, incomplete, and imperfect information. By deception, we can create strategic advantages by exploiting the adversaryÕs lack of information. By counter deception, we can mitigate deceptionÕs effect, neutralize the adversaryÕs deception for resilient operations and safety of military personnel. As new technologies introduce new means to deceive and counter deceive, and new conflicts introduce new adverse impacts and threats to national security and defense, this project aims to build theory and efficient algorithms for designing dynamic deception and counter deception to ensure effective operation against adaptive and persistent adversaries. To this end, we propose to solve hierarchical hypergames with imperfect information, for planning deception or counter deception that accounts for the adversaryÕs responses giving evolving information, disinformation, and noises. Our game-theoretic approaches hinge on a deep understanding of the value of deceit and its dependency on both incomplete prior knowledge and partial observations during interactions. The proposed research comprises the following thrusts in base and option periods.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Feb 24, 2022
- Source ID
- W911NF2210034
Entities
People
- Jie Fu
Organizations
- Army Contracting Command
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- University of Florida