Program Protection of Critical Missions
Abstract
The Department of Defense (DoD) has developed a Trusted Systems strategy which integrates Protection Planning for the development of capabilities, the use of proven mitigation techniques and tools, the ongoing refinement of risk management processes, and creation of needed technology. Current program protection and supply chain risk management efforts primarily target individual Major Defense Acquisition Programs of Record (POR). However, this approach currently lacks a strategic or operational mission focus to identify and assure critical DoD missions, which are comprised of acquisition programs, as well as legacy systems and infrastructure. Globalization of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) markets creates unprecedented opportunities for sophisticated adversaries to defeat not only individual systems, but DoD capabilities through supply chain exploits or other malicious tampering. Defense Planning Guidance, Defense Science Board Reports, and recent deliberations on Nuclear Command, Control and Communications have all acknowledged the problem, and identified the requirement to protect critical missions from cyber and supply chain vulnerabilities. This Quick Reaction Fund effort provides funding for the Department to pilot initial activities to develop methodologies to assess critical mission vulnerability to cyber or supply chain exploit, and assess the utility of available tools, processes and models in conducting such a cross cutting vulnerability assessment. This project will seek to demonstrate the application or expansion of current program protection and supply chain methodologies to a mission-level assessment, focusing on selected exemplar missions. This project will result in an identified mission vulnerability assessment method and available tools, as well as critical gaps in tools in order to inform future development and application of this type of assessment as a standard practice.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Accomplishment
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 2014
- Source ID
- d53fd1d9facacad15b69fe8d4575c6bf