COALITION BARGAINING IN N-PERSON GAMES

Abstract

A theory which deals with a restricted type of coalition formation in n-person games for relatively small values of n is presented. It is a normative, rather than a descriptive, theory in that it provides a rational estimate of the bargaining position of each player in terms of his position in the structure of the game. N-person zero-sum games are considered in which the sole strategic maneuvers are the formations of coaltitions. When a coalition S is formed, the rules shall specify a payment v(S) to the coalition as a whole.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Sep 01, 1961
Accession Number
AD0267309

Entities

People

  • Evar D. Nering

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Bargaining
  • Contracts
  • Corporations
  • Game Theory
  • Government Procurement
  • Governments
  • Guarantees
  • Inequalities
  • Mathematics
  • Negotiations
  • Sequences
  • United States
  • Universities
  • Wisconsin
  • Zero-Sum Games

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Theoretical Analysis.