QUOTA SOLUTIONS OF N-PERSON GAMES

Abstract

A family of solutions for a class Q of n-person games which embraces all constant-sum four-person games and a not inconsiderable array of higher games is presented. They are called 'quota games' because it is possible in them to define a system of individual quotas for the players which determines the effectiveness of the various two-player coalitions. In the solutions most of the players receive their quotas, but there is some latitude for bargaining. The solutions are typically onedimensional sets, consisting sometimes of n line segments joined at the quota point, sometimes of n - 1 disconnected segments. Their behavior under variation of the characteristic function of the game is continuous.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 07, 1952
Accession Number
AD0604085

Entities

People

  • Lloyd Shapley

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Bargaining
  • Boundaries
  • Contracts
  • Convex Sets
  • Corporations
  • Grids
  • Grids (Coordinates)
  • Guarantees
  • Inequalities
  • Latitude
  • Mathematics
  • Military Research
  • Standards
  • Theorems
  • Transitions

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Graph Algorithms and Convex Optimization.