The Dardanelles Revisited: An Examination of the Allied Strategic Aims, the Causes of Failure and the Resulting Prolongation of a World Conflict

Abstract

By the Spring of 1915 the conflict in Europe had settled down to a war of attrition with Russia on the verge of military collapse. A strategic operation in the Dardanelles had been devised by the Allies which, if successfully pursued, could have maintained Russia as a combatant and might have brought the war to an end within a year. The essay examines the political forces which impacted on the operation as well as the military decisions which combined to bring failure to the Allied hopes. Both primary and secondary source material reveals that the campaign, from its inception, suffered from a lack of clear cut national purpose in Paris and London. This indecisiveness was instrumental in the failure and the war spread throughout the world and lasted for another three years.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Nov 09, 1972
Accession Number
AD0760430

Entities

People

  • Henri G. Mallet

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Ground and Sea Platforms

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Aegean Sea
  • Asia
  • Attrition
  • Battles
  • Casualties
  • Central Europe
  • Continents
  • Europe
  • Far East
  • Flat Trajectories
  • Health Services
  • Hospitals
  • Munitions
  • Naval Operations
  • New York
  • North Sea
  • War Colleges

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies