On the Uniqueness of the Shapley Value

Abstract

L. S. Shapley (Shapley, 1953) showed that there is a unique value defined on the class D of all superadditive cooperative games in characteristic function form (over a finite player - set N) which satisfies certain intuitively plausible axioms. Moreover, he raised the question whether an axiomatic foundation could be obtained for a value (not necessarily the Shapley value) in the context of the subclass C (respectively C prime, C double prime) of simple (respectively simple monotonic, simple superadditive) games alone. The paper shows that it is possible to do this.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1974
Accession Number
AD0781113

Entities

People

  • Pradeep Dubey

Organizations

  • Cornell University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Commerce
  • Construction
  • Contracts
  • Cooperative Games
  • Governments
  • Military Research
  • Numbers
  • Operations Research
  • Permutations
  • Real Numbers
  • Security
  • Theorems
  • United States
  • United States Government
  • Vector Spaces

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Mathematical Modeling and Probability Theory.