Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for the 1990s
Abstract
The centerpiece of the new U.S. strategy for the "New World Order" is strategic reserve called the Crisis Response Force, designed to replace many aspects of our current forward defense. This study examines whether strong, standing strategic reserve is appropriate to the American situation in the coming decade; it proceeds by comparing the overall strategy with five historic case studies of systems that faced similar problems and opportunities. The historic models chosen are the Roman Empire (from the fall of Carthage to A.D. 69; from A.D. 69 to A.D. 306; and from A.D. 306 until the final collapse); the Byzantine Empire; and the British Empire from Waterloo-World War I. The study applies a set of seven criteria to each case and systematically examines the results to find pitfalls and mechanisms which may have enduring relevance to a postulated future predicted by the 1991 Naval War College Global War Game. The study concludes that, as a(possibly extended) transitional stage toward an ideal network of regional coalitions, the new national strategy is realistic and effective-except, significantly. in the Middle East where a "naval bridge" approach should be taken. This study was originally prepared as a report for the Strategy and Campaign Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College (Strategy and Campaign Report 12-91).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- AD1007534
Entities
People
- Gary W. Anderson
Organizations
- Naval War College