The Rise of Terrorism in Mali: A Review of the Historical Causes and the Failures of Both Malian and International Efforts
Abstract
Since the 1960s, Mali has faced several insurgencies from groups seeking more autonomy, particularly in the northern parts of the country. Each insurgency has been marked by regional, ethnic, religious, and racial divisions, leading to the formation and subsequent disintegration of short-lived alliances that have made negotiations between Malian insurgent groups and the government complex. Although leadership pursued negotiations, the resulting agreements never became a lasting solution. Most recently, in 2012, insurgent and jihadist groups in the north unified and sparked an unprecedented crisis that has spilled into central Mali. The crisis pushed the French to intervene with Chadian troops, at the request of Malis government, which also requested a European Union training mission to improve the capacity of the Malian security forces. Furthermore, the United Nations authorized an African-led mission, which soon became a UN-led mission, to resolve the conflict. All these initiatives, however, have failed to bring peace. Based on a review of scholarly research and relevant documents, including the peace agreements that followed the prior crises in Mali, this thesis analyzes the underlying causes of the ongoing violence and the factors that have contributed to the failure of the resolution efforts. The thesis builds on those findings to recommend ways in which the government of Mali and international partners can avoid such missteps going forward.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2018
- Accession Number
- AD1069743
Entities
People
- Brehima Sow
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School