Requiem for a Heavyweight Mid-Intensity Conflict and the Army's Ability to Fight and Win the Nation's Operations Other than War
Abstract
This monograph addresses the question of whether the U.S. Army can fight and win the nation's wars when those wars bear little or no resemblance to World War II. The question isolates a problem America's military has faced several times since World War II and is increasingly likely to face again: how to obtain clear, recognizable victory in low-intensity conflict and operations other war. The monograph is a comparative analysis of the different types of war and uses the following as case studies: the low-intensity conflict in Korea (1966-1969), Operation Just Cause, and Operation Desert Storm. It analyzes those conflicts to determine why the U.S. Army continues to emphasize mid-intensity, mechanized warfare at the expense of developing coherent doctrine and skills needed to combat low-intensity threats. The monograph the examines the nature of emerging threats from the Third World and analyzes possible U.S. responses. The result is an evaluation of how and why the U.S. is still committed to fighting its wars in a style reminiscent of World War II and a determination of the effectiveness of the doctrine to guide operations in mid- and low-intensity conflicts. Finally, it assesses current U.S. Army capabilities to meet future Third World threats.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 06, 1994
- Accession Number
- AD1112177
Entities
People
- David Anderson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College