Side-Channel Leakage in Cryptographic Protocols on Complex Devices Software

Abstract

In this project, we study the presence of microarchitectural attacks on complex devices, as well as the impact of these attacks on cryptographic protocols. We and several new side channel leakage sources on computer based systems. We then proceed to empirically evaluate the leakage available using these channels, as well as discussion attack scenarios. Finally, we quantify the impact of our newly discovered leakage sources on cryptographic primitives and protocols, demonstrating secret key recovery.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 01, 2022
Accession Number
AD1163174

Entities

People

  • Andrew Kwong
  • Ayush Agarwal
  • Daniel Genkin
  • Ingab Kang
  • Marina Minkin
  • Stephan Van Schaik

Organizations

  • Board of Regents of the University of Michigan

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Advanced Electronics
  • Cyber
  • Engineered Resilient Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Air Force
  • Air Force Research Laboratories
  • Central Processing Units
  • Computer Networks
  • Computer Program Documentation
  • Computer Programming
  • Computer Programs
  • Computers
  • Cryptography
  • Electromagnetic Radiation
  • Graphical User Interface
  • Human Systems Integration
  • Instruction Set Architecture
  • Laser Spots
  • Operating Systems
  • Personal Computers
  • Processing Equipment
  • Security
  • Security Protocols
  • Software Defined Radio
  • Standards
  • Web Browsers

Fields of Study

  • Computer science
  • Mathematics

Readers

  • Computer Networking
  • Integrated Circuit Design and Technology.
  • Parallel and Distributed Computing.