Consolidating Gains in LSCO: Analyzing the Army's Role in Stability Operations
Abstract
With the updated publication of ADP 3-0 in 2019, the Army operating concept incorporated the need to conduct Large Scale Operations (LSCO) against near-peer threats. This update reflected the changes in the 2018 National Defense Strategy to address increased Chinese and Russian aggression. The doctrine now calls for simultaneous execution of offense, defense, and stability operations, but downtrace doctrine still reflects best practices from counterinsurgency operations. The older doctrine emphasized the use of civilian agencies to conduct stability task at the conclusion of conflict as it transitioned to phase four operations. During counterinsurgency operations the security environment allowed these organizations to work concurrently with the US Army; during LSCO, this may not be the case. Throughout this study the lessons the US Army can learn from the occupation of Japan provide an example of a way to guide the execution of stability tasks while concurrently conducting offense and defense operations during LSCO. At the direction of General MacArthur, the strategy in Japan was to leverage the Japanese government to assist in the rule of millions of people across the country. The execution of occupation tasks was supervised by the military governance of the US Eighth Army. While the occupation of Japan was conducted under unique circumstances, Army leaders can draw lessons that will be useful during the implementation of a transitional military authority during LSCO.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 27, 2021
- Accession Number
- AD1173594
Entities
People
- Jesse C. Cain
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies