A Nonstandard Theory of Games. Part IV. Equilibrium Points for Finite Games.

Abstract

The results obtained in Theorem I.1.15 of Part III of the series on the existence of Nash-type equilibria for Non-cooperative Finite Games are considered under weaker assumptions. The assumption that the payoff functions be S-concave is dropped in favor of the condition that they be quasi-finitely determined. It is then shown that the latter assumption implies the integrability of the payoff functions in the product measure space induced by the mixed strategies of the players. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the payoff functions to be quasi-finitely determined are given a topological characterization.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1979
Accession Number
ADA072521

Entities

People

  • Alain A. Lewis

Organizations

  • Harvard University

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  • California
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Fields of Study

  • Economics

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  • Game Theory.
  • Mathematical Modeling and Probability Theory.

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  • Space
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