Preparing to be Deceived: Counterdeception at the Operational Level of War,
Abstract
This study examines counterdeception capabilities in U.S. Army operational forces. It asks, 'what should be the U.S. Army's capability to counter Soviet deception at the operational level of war? The study first examines counterdeception theory from the writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, Barton Whaley and others to determine what theory suggests our counterdeception capabilities should be. Next, it traces the historical development and use of counterdeception at the operational level of war by analyzing five World War II European theater operations: the 1940 German invasion of France, the German invasion of Russia, the Kharkov operation, the Allied landings at Normandy, and he German Ardennes counteroffensive (Bulge). Theoretically- and historically-derived capabilities are contrasted with current U.S. and Soviet doctrine, followed by a contemporary analysis of Soviet/Warsaw Pact deception against NATO. The final section draws conclusions and implications concerning operational counterdeception in the U.S. Army, focusing upon the areas of doctrine, training, resources and command and staff processes. (KR)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 08, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA195568
Entities
People
- Michael B. Weimer
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College