Finite Approximations to a Zero-Sum Game with Incomplete Information

Abstract

This paper investigates a scheme for approximating a two-person zero- sum game G of incomplete information by means of a natural system G sub mn of its finite subgames. The main question is: For large m and n, is an optimal strategy for G sub mn necessarily an epsilon-optimal strategy for G?

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1986
Accession Number
ADA204650

Entities

People

  • John W. Mamer
  • Kenneth E. Schilling

Organizations

  • University of California, Los Angeles

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Applied Mathematics
  • California
  • Contracts
  • Convergence
  • Data Science
  • Functions (Mathematics)
  • Inequalities
  • Information Science
  • Mathematics
  • Operations Research
  • Probability
  • Random Variables
  • Sequences
  • Standards
  • Statistics
  • Zero-Sum Games

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Statistical inference.