Employment of Irregular Forces in support of Conventional Campaigns
Abstract
This monograph addresses the suitability of irregular forces for employment at the operational level in support of a conventional campaign. The study is motivated by force shortfalls and resource constraints in U.S. contingency planning for conventional campaigns in Southwest Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. A partial solution to these shortfalls and constraints is offered through the employment of Bedouin irregular forces to augment U.S. conventional operations in the area. The study presents a model of the process by which strategic goals are translated into major operations and tactical results within a theater of operations campaign. That model in turn, drives an analysis of the role of irregular forces in Allenby's 1918 campaign in Palestine. The analysis answers the question of whether irregular forces can play an independent operational role in a conventional campaign, and examines why and how they can do so. The monograph concludes that irregulars did play a key role in the Palestine campaign, largely as a result of the imagination and operational artistry of General Allenby and his subordinate, T.E. Lawrence. The reasons behind their sucess with irregulars are identified, and then used to generate specific recommendations for techniques which USCENTCOM might use to exploit irregular warfare in a conventional conflict in Southwest Asia or the Arabian Peninsula. (KR)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 25, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA215790
Entities
People
- Thomas A. Dempsey
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College