Intelligence Support to Arms Control
Abstract
This paper argues that intelligence support is critical to the success of arms control. It identifies and describes the roles of intelligence in the arms control process, describes the existing intelligence organizational structure for arms control support, and identifies and analyzes issues. The roles include support to policy formulation, support to treaty negotiation, support to ratification, and finally, during verification, support for the implementation of the treaty through monitoring. The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for monitoring, while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has responsibility for verification. Adjudication of conflicting interpretations occurs within the NSC committee structure. For several reasons, intelligence cannot be expected to do the actual verification of an arms control treaty. Most importantly, determination of an acceptable degree of confidence is always a political issue, although based on military judgement. Assigning intelligence responsibility for monitoring, rather than verification, helps to limit the politicization of intelligence. Issues identified during the research for this paper were analyzed within three subgroups: those inherent in the intelligence discipline; these must be managed successfully to limit adverse impact on intelligence products. Second, issues and challenges inherent in arms control bureaucratic relationships; these are best managed by keeping separate the actual monitoring analysis and verification this gives the West justification for caution, and reinforces the need for continued emphasis on verification.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 09, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA222911
Entities
People
- Austin E. Grisham Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army War College