Tactical Implications of the U.S. Army's Insurgent War Theory and Counterinsurgent Doctrine
Abstract
This monograph departs from the premise that the US Army's counterinsurgent doctrine is radically different than its conventional doctrine. The monograph suggests that the doctrines and tactics used by an army to prosecute war must be congruent with its theoretical understanding of war. Furthermore, it suggests that success in applying doctrine is limited by what can be accomplished at the tactical level. Consequently, it seeks to establish the capabilities of US conventional forces to execute this alternate doctrine. The monograph compares the unconventional and the conventional theories of war and describes the US Army's counterinsurgent doctrine. The purpose is to identify what tactical missions the security forces of a country must accomplish to effectively prosecute a counterinsurgency. The capabilities and limitations of US conventional forces are then assessed to see which of these missions they could realistically be expected to accomplish if committed in a direct combat role in a counterinsurgency. Keywords: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Unconventional war, Infantry, Guerrilla warfare.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 05, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA225483
Entities
People
- Francis X. Kinney
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College