The British Experience in Northern Ireland: A Model for Modern Peacemaking Operations?
Abstract
This monograph examines the evolution of the British Army's tactics and doctrine during its employment in support of the civil powers in Northern Ireland and compares these evolutions to its conventional warfighting doctrine. The ultimate objective is to determine whether there is a set of unique and/or common tactical imperatives, read here as tactics, techniques and procedures, for peacemaking operations which might allow U.S. forces to be properly manned, trained and equipped before their commitment to such operations. The British Army's operations in Northern Ireland have evolved over the last twenty-three years not only to meet the threat but also to conform to shifts in governmental policy toward the resolution of the troubles. As a result of this long-term commitment, the British Army has adapted itself to man, train, and equip a significant portion of its force structure, between 20% and 33% infantry battalions at any one time, for operations in Northern Ireland while retaining its other unilateral and coalition commitments. The bottom line is that the battalion that deploys to Northern Ireland is significantly different in structure, capability and method of operations than one configured for conventional operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 25, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA264419
Entities
People
- William J. Miller
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College