The Dardanelles Operations and the Gaillipoli Campaign: A Crisis in Leadership. What do They have to say to Today's Operational Artists?
Abstract
Successful resolutions ot today's military operations, among the most complex or all human activities, are seldom achieved or thwarted as a result of one factor. A combination of many disparate colors from the operational artists palette results in a coherent portrait of victory or defeat. The study of Amphibious Warfare Operations--littoral warfare-is de rigueue for any current or potential Commander in Chief or Joint Force Commander. According to some historians, in war, we never learn very much from successfully or overwhelming defeats. Rather it is the "very nearlys" that have the most to military leadership to optimally perform their wartime duties. Nowhere in the course of 20th century warfare was there a more nearly won campaign, than in 1915 on the Callipoli peninsula, the site of the largest amphibious assault until that time. A series of as many as six linked m1ajor operations, lasting over a year, all with the same unattainable objective - winning the First World War on the cheap--marked what became the Callipoli campaign. Although no attempt is made to definitely recount all of its engagements, battles, and operations, some salient learning points are drawn from these events that may be useful to today's leaders, focusing on a few of the more critical operational judgments that may have parallels in future operations. An examination of the two most critical aspects of successful warfighting, leadership and logistics, reveals how the Allies failed to deal with many other facets of operational art. (KAR) p. 2
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 16, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA297735
Entities
People
- David J. Delia
Organizations
- Naval War College