Did the United Nations and or the United States Ignore the Atrocities/Genocide in Rwanda?
Abstract
This monograph analyzes the military operation of Rwanda in order to determine if the United Nations and or the United States ignored the atrocities and or genocide in Rwanda. This operation was viewed from the positions of the United Nations, National Command Authorities, and the United States military and the linkage to include the impact they had on each other. This monograph demonstrates that the UN and US did not leverage their full capabilities to support the Rwandan mission. The UN authorized missions but the members that make up the UN did not provide the necessary resources in order to conduct the mission(s) properly. Many leaders in the United States held the position for quite some time that the events in Rwanda were not a national interest to the US, so the US would not commit forces. This action was not supported by the policies of the Clinton Administration. The US military also did not support the Rwanda operation due the recently failed UN mission in Somalia. The US failed once the Commander-In-Chief requested options to provide the full range of courses of action available. The importance of this monograph for the operational commander and or planner is that the responsibility of the military is to provide options to the National Command Authorities regardless of their personal opinions regarding the use of military forces to conduct operations such as those in Somalia or Rwanda dislike of the military operation(s). Another lesson from the Rwandan mission for an operational commander and or a planner is that one must always use the deliberate planning process because it allows the best range of options during the crisis planning process.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA381928
Entities
People
- Morris T. Goins
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College