The Cost of Defense Sanctions: A Case Study of Indonesia and Pakistan
Abstract
Sanctions have come under increasing scrutiny in the late 1990s. Punitive policies meant to compel change, sanctions are being labeled ineffective and, in many cases, harmful to the interests of the sanctioning state. Despite this, sanctions continue to be the policy of choice when dealing with recalcitrant states. Defense sanctions have seemed the appropriate policy prescription for countries whose militaries commit crimes or jeopardize democratic reform. The issue though is that severing defense ties with these regimes has, in some cases, cut contact with a weak state's most powerful institution, jeopardized fledgling reform movements within the state and not resulted in an improved or safer security environment Recently, U.S. imposed sanctions have increasingly resulted in a rise in prominence of destabilizing influences in the target country and helped create, or, at least, not arrest the formation of a failed or near-failed state, thus jeopardizing the region's security. A look at Asian states that have been targets of U.S. defense sanctions reveals severing ties has not been an impetus for regime changes, military reform, or increased stability in the state or region. An analysis of Indonesia and Pakistan reveals that severing defense ties has not only been unsuccessful, but has resulted in exacerbating the conditions which served to initially justify enacting the sanctions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA392341
Entities
People
- Stephen C. Ball
Organizations
- United States Army War College