Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali: Approaches to Engaging Local Actors
Abstract
Although Mali has been a major recipient of U.S. military and development programs for almost a decade, in 2012, a known Al Qa'ida affiliate, Al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and largely indigenous Islamist allies, Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), successfully took advantage of Mali s political instability and military weakness to amass power.1 Mali s vaunted democracy, moreover, collapsed in a military coup, while on the northern battlefields, the Malian Army s performance was disastrous. In other words, all the past assumptions about Mali s political stability, internal cohesion, and military capabilities were revealed to be deeply flawed. U.S. policymakers worries turned to some degree into relief when, in January 2013, France intervened to halt the Islamist groups offensive into southern Mali and soon expelled them from the three major northern cities they had controlled for almost a year. The relief, however, is premature. The French, and the African forces that joined them, appear to have scattered the militants more than defeated them, and the coalition has not secured the entire territory beyond the larger towns.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA580961
Entities
People
- Michael Shurkin
- Stephanie Pezard
Organizations
- RAND Corporation