Solving Defender-Attacker-Defender Models for Infrastructure Defense
Abstract
This paper (a) describes a defender-attacker-defender sequential game model (DAD) to plan defenses for an infrastructure system that will enhance that system's resilience against attacks by an intelligent adversary, (b) describes a realistic formulation of DAD for defending a transportation network, (c) develops a decomposition algorithm for solving this instance of DAD and others, and (d) demonstrates the solution of a small transportation-network example. A DAD model generally evaluates system operation through the solution of an optimization model, and the decomposition algorithm developed here requires only that this system-operation model be continuous and convex. For example, our transportation-network example incorporates a congestion model with a (convex) nonlinear objective function and linear constraints.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA582412
Entities
People
- David L. Alderson
- Gerald G. Jerry Brown
- R. Kevin Wood
- W. M. Carlyle
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School