Malian Security Force Assistance Study (MSFAS)
Abstract
The 2012-2013 Mali crisis clearly demonstrated the need for substantial reform in the Malian security sector. The Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) suffered severe defeats at the hands of militant groups, overthrew the democratically elected government in a coup d tat, and ultimately lost control over more than half the country. As a result of the coup d tat, the U.S. Government halted all security assistance to Mali, but the lifting of restrictions on assistance in September 2013 has created the potential for this activity to resume. U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) sponsored this study to analyze Malian security challenges and reform requirements so as to inform USARAF and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) planning in the event that the U.S. Government decides to resume security assistance to Mali. The study did not analyze the merits of U.S. security assistance to Mali and therefore offers no recommendations for U.S. policy. It is only intended to inform future security cooperation planning. Subsequent analysis, especially in terms of costs, benefits, and prospects for success, could help policymakers determine if renewed security assistance to Mali would support U.S. interests in the region. The study concluded that due to severe political, social, and economic challenges, a low starting capacity, and limited resources, building a professional and independently functioning Malian security sector will be a very difficult and lengthy endeavor with no guarantee of success. If a significant program of reform is to be attempted, the primary focus should be on building institutions rather than increasing tactical or operational capacity.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2014
- Accession Number
- ADA602283
Entities
People
- William M. Fabian
Organizations
- Center for Army Analysis